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The About-faces in Christopher Nolan’s The Dark Knight
Larrie Dudenhoeffer
Kennesaw State University
When, from one group to another,  the plastic  form [of the mask] is preserved,  the semantic  
function is inverted. On the other hand, when the semantic function is retained, it is the plastic  
form that is inverted.
Claude Levi-Strauss, The Way of the Masks
[The] emotions I perform through the mask (the false persona) that I adopt can in a strange way  
be more authentic and truthful than what I assume that I feel in myself.
Slavoj Žižek, How to Read Lacan 
In Tim Burton’s Batman (1989), the opening credits sequence maps the contours of what 
appears to be some undecipherable structure, the camera sliding along its walls,  curves,  and 
grooves, which turn out to index the chest symbol of the film’s title character. This sequence 
suggests that this sign, or rather the idea for it, emerges from a center, as it traces out the canals, 
cavities, ridges, sockets, and nerves of the splanchnocranium or facial skeleton. The stylization 
of Gotham City in the film—a strange mixture of the Gothic, Expressionist, and Art Deco—also 
suggests that its grotesqueness rises from the spirit of its vain consumerist citizens, its corrupt 
officials, and its Mafioso industrialists. These sets find their counterpart in Batman’s costume, 
which  is  also animalistic,  anthropomorphic,  and  steely-robotic  all  at  once.  It  too  contains  a 
centre, reclusive millionaire Bruce Wayne (Michael Keaton), who, as one youngster in the set-up 
to the film’s first action scene suggests, can right the “wrong direction” that Gotham society is 
taking. In contrast, Christopher Nolan’s The Dark Knight (2008) eschews the notion of a centre, 
no one truly inhabiting the character’s costume or its symbolic vesture. In this update, everything 
wears a mask, and the film implies that there is nothing under these masks. As Renata Salecl 
makes  clear,  “when  the  subject  sacrifices  his  desire  to  the  Ideal,  when  he  completely 
subordinates himself to symbolic identity and takes on a symbolic mask, it is in this mask that 
2one can discern his  desire” (11).  As desire  traverses  our  symbolic  identities,  it  undergoes  a 
continuous deformation,  transcoding the  qualities  of  the  flesh and stretching  them into such 
“externalities”  as  our  moral  ideals,  spatial  ensembles,  ideological  coordinates,  aesthetic 
sensibilities, and social outfits. The desire of the characters in The Dark Knight remains mobile, 
acentric,  and  indeterminate,  impossible  to  neatly  situate  or  describe  in  somatic  or 
representational terms alone. The masks these characters wear rather span these terms and thus 
carry the stamp of their topological relation to the face. 
Take Batman (Christian Bale), for instance. His costume functions in three ways: first, to 
cover Bruce Wayne’s face, to mask his identity; then to shield his flesh, to mask his vulnerability; 
and finally  to terrify  his  enemies,  in  other words,  to mask his  humanity.  Moreover,  Batman 
growls rather than speaks, and speaks only to flatly deliver imperatives or convey information of 
a rather serious nature. This voice is also a maski, yet another form of image-management, as it 
serves  to  contrast  the  insipidities  and supercilious  tone coming from Bruce  Wayne’s mouth. 
Unlike Michael Keaton’s take on the character, full of anguish and self-obsession in and out of 
the costume, Christian Bale’s Bruce Wayne is the costume of Batman rather than its centre, its 
aloof, careless, and womanizing appearance a stratagem to make Gotham think it impossible that 
this man, despite his resources and traumatic adolescence, might ever entertain such vigilante 
ambitions. An objection to the claim that The Dark Knight de-centres its subject might suggest 
that  Bruce  Wayne’s  interactions  with  associates  like  Alfred  Pennyworth  (Michael  Caine)  or 
Lucius Fox (Morgan Freeman) index or reveal his “real character.” However, these scenes show 
us that this “real” Bruce Wayne is only the most real-seeming mask in the film: this normal, 
thoughtful  side  to  the  character,  free  from  maladjustment  or  social  dysfunction,  masks  the 
inhuman drive  and the  unnatural  ability  to  fight  multiple  criminals  at  once  despite  nagging 
injuries and mental  strain.  Unlike in  Burton’s film, where the symbol rises out of an “inner 
nature,” in Nolan’s film “inner nature” is merely another symbol, a supplement to a chain of 
identities (superhero-rake-everyman). The mask, then, as it shields Batman’s face from trauma, 
re-contours the “inner nature” of the skeletofacial, turning the skull inside out so that this mask 
terrifies enemies, as it exoskeletally suggests the Totenkopf or memento mori underneath the face 
it covers.
The Joker features as the main villain in Batman and The Dark Knight. In the first film, 
Jack Napier (Jack Nicholson) falls into a vat of chemicals that somehow discolour his skin and 
3twist his mouth into a smile. These disfigurements, though, even as they caricature the superhero 
associations of the mask, also function to disguise the centre of this character: Bruce Wayne 
manages to access Napier’s crime records and psychological profile, and this information, more 
than indicative of the “inner nature” responsible for the madcap antics, clothing, and dialogue of 
this character, resituates the Joker at the centre of Batman’s own inception. Wayne reminisces, 
concocting a phantasmatic scenario of Napier murdering his mother and father on their way out 
of a movie theatre, the ultimate re-elaboration of a “screen memoryii”. In Nolan’s film, though, a 
more ferocious Joker (Heath Ledger), self-describing as an “agent of chaos,” wears masks with 
no such psychological or autobiographical depth underneath them. This Joker, who uses “war-
paint,” constructs the mask as superficial, a stylistic contrivance rather than some conceivable 
outcome of a near-fatal accident. 
The film refuses to authorise an “origin story” for this villain. When about to carve a 
smile into a victim’s face,  the Joker often asks,  “Wanna know how I got these scars?”.  For 
example, while sticking a switchblade down a mobster’s throat, he narrates this story:
My father was... a drinker. And a fiend. And one night he goes off crazier than usual. 
Mommy gets the kitchen knife to defend herself. He doesn't like that. Not one bit. So—
me watching—he takes the knife to her, laughing while he does it! Turns to me, and he 
says, “Why so serious, son?” Comes at me with the knife... “Why so serious?” He sticks 
the blade in my mouth...
Later  in  the  film,  though,  while  accosting  Rachel  Dawes  (Maggie  Gyllenhaal),  Gotham’s 
assistant district attorney, the Joker fabricates a different account of the scars:
So I had a wife, beautiful, like you, who tells me I worry too much. Who tells me I ought 
to smile more. Who gambles and gets in deep with the sharks... Look at me! One day, 
they carve her face. And we have no money for surgeries. She can't take it. I just want to 
see her smile again. I just want her to know that I don't care about the scars. So I stick a 
razor in my mouth and do this...
The scars themselves thus come to function as masks, in the Nietzschean sense of demanding 
another mask on top of themiii. As a different sort of mask, more a theatrical device, they draw 
attention to the circles of the eyes, the whiteness of the skin, and the contraction of the mouth, 
and thus as myofacial retrace the expressions of the mimetic muscles. This “mask” enables the 
Joker to try on multiple origins, extending the efferent motor functions of these muscles to make 
4even criminal acts seem conducive to a wide grin, while mocking at and decentralising such 
ideas as “self,” “causality,” or “truth.”  The Dark Knight, through the figure of the Joker, more 
than re-qualifies the content of the origin story; rather the film unmasks its fundamentally fictive, 
multisemic, unreliable nature. In doing so, it makes radically eccentric one of the staples of the 
superhero genre; the origin story factors in  Batman and such other films as  Superman  (1978), 
Spider-Man (2002), Hellboy (2004), Iron Man (2008), and Nolan’s own franchise reboot Batman 
Begins (2005). The Dark Knight, in fact, calls into question the authenticity of the first film’s title  
and narrative.  It  renders that film as more than a retelling of the title character’s  origins;  it 
renders it as another “mask,” covering up the fact that it is as unreliable, context-driven, and 
“made up” as any of the Joker’s dramatic asides.
The Dark Knight differs from these origin stories on the surface, though, since its Gotham 
City seems utterly realistic, with transnationals dotting the skyline and noir-ish slums, tenements, 
and alleyways creeping alongside them. This urban realism too is a mask, though. Gotham City 
and Hong Kong, where  an important  narrative  device and action set-piece  occur,  wear  each 
other’s cultural trappings. The Joker, for example, walks in on a meeting of Gotham crime-lords 
as they teleconference with a Chinese accountant wanting to secure their collective assets. The 
mise-en-scène  re-creates  the  criminal  atmospheres  of  such  East  Asian  comic  adaptations  as 
Oldboy (2003) and Ichi the Killer (2001). Batman tracks the accountant to Hong Kong, whisking 
the  captive  away  from Chinese  authorities  with  a  skyhook.  The  entire  scene  occurs  in  the 
skyscraper of the LSI Holdings Corporation, the resemblance of its stealth,  surveillance, and 
telecommunication technologies to those of Wayne Enterprises suggesting that, under the rule of 
global capitalism, Gotham City and Hong Kong function reciprocally as each other’s mask. As 
Andrew Sarris notes in a review of the film:
Yet  at  a  time  when  all  social  systems  are  veering  toward  moral  bankruptcy,  […] 
Gotham City is presented for  the first  time in  Batman movie history as  a  city  with 
global connections, and not merely as a self-contained abstraction of a city with its own 
hermetically sealed morality and innocence. (2)
The  Dark  Knight  transitions  from  an  action  set-piece  in  a  car  multi-storey  that  showcases 
Batman’s expertise in martial arts to a scene with LHI trying to negotiate a deal with Bruce 
Wayne  and  Lucius  Fox.  These  scenes  obviously  consist  of  “global  connections”  while  also 
5motioning towards the “abstraction” of the conceptual status of the “city,” a reminder that the 
mask often functions to deceive. 
In On Belief, Slavoj Žižek argues that the mask represents the correlative of feces, in that 
these two objects  take over one’s inner nature, exteriorizing something from the subject that 
seems alien to it. In short, the mask assumes “a life of its own” even as it compels certain modes 
of conduct out of its wearer (62). Batman exemplifies the subject’s “extimate” relation with the 
mask, which, as the mark of such “external compulsion,” can only assume consistency in relation 
to an “inner formless body” (63). When The Dark Knight drops the fighting technique of Hong 
Kong action films into a Western-style urban shootout in the car deck, it dislocates the origin, 
usage, and conventional meaning of these cultural forms, which require someone “formless,” 
such as Bruce Wayne, to at once contain them and still embody their appearance. In the film, 
then, the mask, or rather this technique, does not take over Batman’s inner nature so much as it 
denatures  this  character,  marking  its  “self”  as  always  multiple  and elsewhere.  Similarly,  the 
Gotham or otherwise metropolitan cityscape represents the mobilisation, rather than the site, of 
multinational interests. Gotham is more a vector than a centre of commerce, much as the mask 
sets forth the transitivity of cultural styling, not neatly its concentration, meaning that it extends 
to every facet of this character who can remove the costume, but never the maskiv. 
The scene in the Wayne Enterprises meeting room with the Chinese delegate makes this 
connection more concrete. In it, Wayne sleeps through the meeting and after it informs Fox that 
the deal is off  owing to LHI’s dodgy financials. This feint,  itself another mask, suggests the 
eccentricity  and  the  simultaneous  convergence-divergence  of  this  character’s  identities:  the 
useless multimillionaire displaces on site the global citizen and the vigilante crime-fighter, those 
“satellites” that nonetheless direct this scene to its ethical and narrative resolution. The mask, 
then, while it dissimulates as “realistic,” in its relation to Gotham and Hong Kong also functions 
as an expansive net of relays, rather than as some colonizing agent (which necessarily implies 
something  intrinsic  to  colonize).  To  track  down  the  Joker,  Batman  taps  into  the  city’s 
communications network, transforming its signals into sonar-driven computer simulacra of the 
actions and locations of everyone there. This scene, which at first seems one more mask, the 
digital mockup of urban space, more significantly exposes what the streets of Gotham and the 
commercial  districts  of  Hong  Kong  conceal:  the  information  web  or  net  that  remains 
“everywhere and nowhere,” structuring the transit and activity of men, money, and materials 
6from relays in constant  circulation, who are themselves without any determining centre. The 
“real”  Gotham  only  masks  its  own  digital  modelling,  the  computer  systems  simulating, 
assessing, calculating, and controlling its traffic flows, asset shares, and structural redesigns. The 
Dark Knight, then, does not merely mask or screen the city’s modern internationalist realities; its 
special  effects  suggest  that  the  city  is  these  effects,  is  really  only  another  composition  of 
computer-generated images. 
Of  course,  the  “wiretapping”  in  the  film  seems  an  overt  reference  to  one  of  the 
controversies of the George W. Bush regime: the codification of the right of federal agents to 
monitor the communication channels of terrorist suspects without first obtaining a court warrant. 
Andrew Klavan in The Wall Street Journal describes the film as “a conservative movie about the 
war on terror” that dramatises “the values and necessities that the Bush administration cannot 
seem to articulate” (A15). Its script at times certainly seems to valorise this doctrine. Outside of 
its fairly overt references to wiretapping and domestic terrorism, for example, a voiceover in the 
film asks the viewer to take “faith” in the symbolic efficacy and rightness of its title superhero, 
metaphorically nominal of the “superpower” status of U.S. foreign interventionism: “Sometimes 
the truth isn't good enough, sometimes people deserve more. Sometimes people deserve to have 
their  faith  rewarded.”  Of  course,  the  2003  State  of  the  Union  speech  also  manipulatively 
sentimentalises “the goodness and idealism and faith of the American people” (5). Still, David 
Bordwell cautions against such “Zeitgeist” readings of the film, claiming them misconstructions 
of the cinema’s relation to current events, since its mainstream offerings during any one release 
season cover a number of topics meant to draw in viewers multilaterally from different cultures, 
class sectors, and sensibilities. In fact, analogies with the Bush administration underestimate or 
fail to consider Lucius Fox’s disgust over Batman’s invasive use of surveillance technologies. He 
tenders his resignation from Wayne Enterprises over it, effective upon the Joker’s apprehension. 
The Dark Knight, though, more than suggests in this scene the violation of a democratic social 
contract; it speaks to a near Kantian notion of moral duty, where the subject makes the Law the 
imperative of its desire over and above its more appetitive or “pathological” interests. In a sense, 
since this desire seems clearly unattainable to the subject, it comes to take the very substance of 
desire as its desire, as Alenka Zupančič observes:
7[The] ethics of desire is the ethics of fidelity to a […] fundamental lack that introduces a 
gap between the Thing and things, and reminds us of the fact that beyond all ready-to-
hand objects, there is “someThing” which alone would make our life worth living. (240) 
The rather quotidian displays of the Gothamites on Fox’s computer monitors thus function as 
masks of the moral law that Batman must traverse in order for it to dovetail into such an ethics of 
desire.
 At first glance, this scene asks the viewer to make a similar gesture in condoning this 
character’s actions, which squares the mask, the Law, the images on the screen, and the digital 
skins on the monitors as instances of the dermatofacial, each concealing the inner from the outer, 
or  “someThing” among many things.  The film thus  contains  several  Batman impersonators, 
civilians who wear the costume and sympathise with its ethic—as one of them tells the Joker, 
Batman's “a symbol that we don't have to be afraid of scum like you”—although none of them in 
the  slightest  resembles  the  strength,  intelligence,  resourcefulness,  or  resilience  of  their 
inspiration. However, this interpretation refigures Bruce Wayne as an “original,” as the arbiter of 
the costume’s ethical meaning.  As  Zupančič argues, though, the moral law insists  as a form 
rather than a set content, remaining stable in the face of contingencies even while it de-centres 
subjective experience, always requiring the subject to act as if it were to thereby universalise its 
choices. She writes that although the universal “achieves its determination” through the ethical 
subject, it also achieves its substance as an ethics of this subject’s fantasy, so that “we cannot 
deny all ethical dignity to someone who is ready to die (and to kill) in order to realize [this] 
fantasy” (61-2, 254). Batman thus refuses to offhandedly murder the Joker, even though such as 
act might seem sensibly utilitarian, since doing so means desiring everyone in Gotham to resort 
to such violent expediencies. The citizens on the screens certainly represent a “moral duty” worth 
fighting for, owing to their smallish interests, not despite them, making the universal itself a 
mask for the right to chase down our individual desires in our own individual spaces. The film’s 
overtures  to  the  Bush  doctrine  must  also  function  as  a  mask,  not  for  its  more  critical  or 
subversive  agenda  so  much as  for  the  dubiousness  of  whatever  the  universal  “rewards”  for 
complying with the demands of moral duty. Batman’s symbolic wager calls on Gotham to freely 
choose such service, which amounts to following the course of their desires in reclusive spaces 
where they can cause no significant troublev. In short, The Dark Knight does not condone “state 
of emergency” complaisance or demonstrate any real ambivalence to it. It wears current events to 
8enlist the viewer’s desires in the service of the cinema, at once to shut out “dutiful” involvement 
in the ethicopolitcal scene and to compel re-seeing it from its own eyeholes. After all, the cinema 
shares something in common with the mask, in that once inside them everything else around the 
corners of our eyes darkens.     
A serious misimpression of The Dark Knight comes about if we describe in such Kantian 
terms Batman’s refusal to allow the Joker to fall from a skyscraper under construction to his 
death,  as in Burton’s film, where the Nicholson version falls from a cathedral.  Harvey Dent 
(Aaron  Eckhart),  the  district  attorney  who  turns  into  the  villain  Two-Face  when  the  Joker 
disfigures the right side of his body, restructures the opposition of moral duty to pathological 
interest  in  the  film in  three  ways.  First,  the  name Two-Face  connotes  a  mask,  a  deceptive 
appearance concealing ulterior motives. He represents Batman’s obverse as Gotham’s “White 
Knight.” The superhero’s moral strength commutes into Gothamites’ self-involvement,  which 
rich socialite  and gossip columnist  darling  Bruce Wayne typifies.  Harvey Dent  reverses  this 
commutation,  confusing  ruthless  careerism with  moral  duty  and  thus  earning  the  nickname 
“Two-Face” as an Internal Affairs operative. His alter ego in turn sacrifices reputation, comfort, 
and institutional sanction in summarily executing the maniacs, corrupt officers, and vigilantes 
responsible for the unsafe condition of Gotham’s streets. His death inspires Batman to assume 
another mask, this time culpability for these extralegal deeds, for two reasons: for moral ones, so 
that Harvey Dent remains a White Knight in the eyes of citizens, and also for more pathological 
ones, so thenceforth criminals will fear the Dark Knight as fully capable of murder.
Moreover, since the White Knight and the Dark Knight represent two sides of the same 
coin, their relationship recasts that of Batman and the Joker as two ends of the same face-card. In 
their  climactic  fight,  Batman  catches  the  Joker  from  falling  and  holds  him  upside-down. 
Strangely, though, the subsequent close-up of the Joker frames him right side -up. He succeeds, 
we might infer, in turning Gotham and the film’s globalist imaginary upside-down. After all, at 
one  moment  in  the  film the  Joker  sets  afire  a  stack  of  money ironically  in  the  shape  of  a 
skyscraper.  More than a  terrorist  or  an  anarchistic  agent  of  chaos,  though,  the Joker  mocks 
Batman’s inability to let go, exposing the Law’s symptomatic or obscene desire not to eliminate 
the criminal as its driving force. Whereas the Joker in the scene seemingly wears an expression 
of sheer elation, Batman wears one of anguish and consternation. What if, once again, though, 
these expressions were masks of each other? In this case, the Joker’s smile must at the same time 
9appear to the careful viewer as upside-down, as a frown of displeasure, since Batman frustrates 
the Joker’s desire to make Gotham’s two Knights over into his own murderous images. Batman, 
whom the film also frames right side-up, must then also appear to smile vexatiously to the Joker. 
His restraint certainly does not make the Law into some absolute or transcendental form, as it at 
once mocks and confirms the Joker’s thesis that 
This is what happens when an unstoppable force meets an immovable object. You are 
truly incorruptible, aren't you? Huh? You won't kill me out of some misplaced sense of 
self-righteousness. And I won't kill you because you're just too much fun. I think you and 
I are destined to do this forever.
The  course  of  their  dialogue,  though,  contradicts  the  surface  contradiction  of  “self-
righteousness” with “fun,” when the Joker informs Batman, “I took Gotham's White Knight, and 
I brought him down to our level.” This scene thus takes the self-abnegating desire for moral 
order and “brings it down” to an ultimately sadistic taking of satisfaction (away) from others. 
The incomplete skyscraper, the setting of their dialogue, stands in for Two-Face, “the real Harvey 
Dent” on whom the Joker stakes “the battle for Gotham's soul.” It suggests the Law in its radical 
incompleteness requires an obscene supplement and vice versa, and also that it must remain this 
way since it motions towards the solipsistic enjoyment of its subjects, which, as the computer 
surveillance system shows us, rebounds on to the intersubjective, even if through the mediation 
of a screen.
 Two-Face finally de-authenticates the Joker-Batman relation as a thematic opposition of 
chaos and order. He flips a trademark coin so as to make decisions: its undamaged face side 
dictates a merciful resolution to a conflict, whereas its other side, with scars resembling Two-
Face’s own disfigurement, dictates a deadlier one. If Batman channels chaos into making a duty 
out of restoring order to the city, and the Joker order into the romanticisation of chaos, then Two-
Face represents their  synergy in  the  mode of  chance.  He thus embodies  one of  the  internal 
contradictions  of  the  capitalist  adventure,  namely  the  economic  measurement  of  the  ultra-
dynamic and always chancy forces that  determine market  rates,  shareholder  confidence,  and 
money values, estimates vital to corporations like LHI, Wayne Enterprises, and Warner Bros. 
Cornelius Castoriadis argues that the study of economics, even though it cannot account for all 
those  variables  that  affect  the  circulation  of  wealth,  nonetheless  functions  to  rationalise 
capitalism and to make it seem scientific and critiques of it wrongheaded (56). He further argues 
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that  “systems  of  simultaneous  equations”  work  in  this  economy  exactly  as  a  “disguise  of 
scientific exactness” that masks an “endless succession of changing imbalances” (61). Two-Face, 
more than embodying such “imbalances,” represents the structural affinities of this science with 
its underside, the violence, avarice, and threat of collapse that often makes market speculation as 
contingent as flipping a coin. His characterisation also fleshes these structural affinities out, with 
the  White  Knight  the  face  of  sociocommercial  self-correction and Two-Face  one  of  shocks, 
ethical shortcuts, and inner conflicts.  The two faces of Two-Face together resemble a sort of 
comedy-tragedy mask. They function more so as a mask of infamy, as a constant reminder of 
Two-Face’s flaws,  errors,  and moral failures,  and thus as an instrument of chastisement.  His 
mask  animates  the  neurofacial,  marking  certain  twists  in  the  subjectively  relative  state  of 
embodiment.  Its  dystonic exterior  registers  more  than facial  spasms, cramps,  and soft  tissue 
injuries; it registers the face’s deviation from a centre, its momentary freedom from the usual 
surface appearance of things. All three characters, Two-Face, Batman, and the Joker, reflexively 
and mutlilocally represent the masks of capitalist, micropolitical, and technological development. 
At the same time, we must take care not to reduce the film to ideological mystification or false 
consciousness, which simply adds another mask to the very notion of a mask, a fantasy of its 
“base” meaning.  
 This essay therefore wears its own mask: it is not an exercise in the deconstruction of The 
Dark Knight, the cinema, or even the face, as though there was no ontological specificity to any 
of  them.  While  it  does  not  argue  for  the  face’s  empirical  givennessvi,  it  also  does  not 
simplistically and unoriginally define the face as a Nietzschean mask, a crust of interpretations 
inconstant to the “spirit” of a text. In spite of its equivocal functions, the mask images the very 
redundancy  of  facialityvii,  as  an  accent  or  compass  of  its  anatomisation.  The  Dark  Knight  
suggests that the mask repositions the skeletal, the integumentary, and the neuro-muscular, those 
annexes for signification, subject-formation, and the symbolic manifold of the flesh. The masks 
in  the  film  altogether  comprise  the  topofacial,  their  flatness  mapping  into  the  three-
dimensionality of globalist, ideological, and intrabodily space. The flesh, the screen, those spaces
—each operates as the other’s facelift, much as the masks of the characters in the film remain 
fungible, their smiles always invertible into a frown, their frowns always capable of changing 
into a smile once again.  
iEndnotes
 Few commentators on the film notice that Christian Bale seems to imitate Clint Eastwood’s gravelly 
voice in The Dark Knight. This manner of speaking, along with making certain wisecracks throughout 
the film, makes Batman more of a parodist than the Joker, who in contrast seems rather somber, taking 
advantage of any opportunity to make up some distressing story about his roots as a sociopath. 
ii  Sigmund Freud defines such scenes as “displaced memories from which the essential element has for 
the most part been omitted” (119). They do not seem to emerge from an indiscernible centre, though, as 
they rather take on form at the moment of their arousal (126).
iii  In Beyond Good and Evil, Friedrich Nietzsche famously writes, “Every profound spirit needs a mask: 
even more, around every profound spirit a mask is growing continually, owing to the constantly false, 
namely shallow, interpretation of every word, every step, every sign of life he gives” (51). In this way, 
every opinion waxes into “a hideout, every word also a mask” (229).
iv Margaret Morse theorises three features of “nonspace,” the exchange of virtuality and actuality and 
the derealisation of everyday experience and representational space. Specifically, these features include 
its displacement from its own surroundings, its dislocation from the nodes of orientation in a cityscape 
or countryside, and its disengagement from the reality of face-to-face contact (197-200). Therefore 
spaces like malls or freeways operate as “vectors,” “channels of motion” that subjects experience as 
relay-points  rather  than destinations  (199).  The Dark  Knight  and many contemporary  action  films 
enlarge this notion, applying it to their entire diegetic universes, their representational systems, or their 
insecure referential anchors in social reality. 
v A November 8, 2001 George W. Bush speech to Atlanta police, postal, and firefighter representatives 
valorises the fact that Americans “are going about their daily lives, working and shopping and playing 
[…] going to movies and to baseball games” as “the ultimate repudiation of terrorism.”  
vi
 According to Paul de Man, the face appears a rhetorical construction of the infant subject, involving 
the synecdochic assemblage of its features, eyes, ears, nose, mouth, and so forth (92).
vii  Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari dispense with the Freudian transposition of the sex organs onto the 
face  in  dreams  or  artistic  works,  arguing  in  A  Thousand  Plateaus that  the  face  operates  as 
“redundancy,” with its “wall” the screen of signification and its features the rim-holes of subjectivity 
that together re-territorialise the rest of the body. They write, “Faces are not basically individual; they 
define zones of frequency or probability” and also “loci of resonance that select the sensed or mental 
reality and make it conform in advance to a dominant reality.” They conclude that faces are at once 
surfaces  “in  redundancy  with  the  redundancies  of  signifiance  or  frequency”  and  also  maps  in 
redundancy with “those of resonance or subjectivity” (168, 170).
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